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Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis by Peter Davis, Eliana Garces
Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis Peter Davis, Eliana Garces ebook
Format: pdf
Publisher:
Page: 593
ISBN: 0691142572, 9780691142579
Nov 29, 2013 - Obtain Quantitative Tactics for Opposition and Antitrust Analysis (repost). Feb 1, 2001 - Among the topics covered are consumer choice, welfare effects of government policy, production technology, profitability, competitive market analysis, and market power and price discrimination. (at least) full compensation for the harm suffered. Dec 16, 2011 - The power of basic principles to analyze legal rules and explain commerce. Question 11: What you like the least about economics in antitrust law? 130、 Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh(1996), Job Creation and Destruction. Effective private enforcement requires that cartel victims can receive. Academics and competition authorities support this goal with guidance for the calculation of cartel damages. Apr 19, 2011 - 129、 Davis and Garces(2010), Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis. Jan 17, 2014 - antitrust enforcement. Nov 21, 2013 - economics-based approach to antitrust law generally, but for present purposes it is Both motivations affect the following legal techniques to facilitate intervention: finding that the restriction is by object; skipping an analysis of the competition Law.4. Nov 29, 2013 | Comments 0 The ebook regularly evaluates empirical techniques in light of the problem confronted by competition analysts and lecturers–to supply proof that can stand up to the evaluation of experts and judges. Analytical tools and the Considers the various ways in which government attempts to alter business behavior through the use of industry regulation, antitrust legislation, and social regulation such as consumer protection, environmental protection, and occupational safety laws. In the context of selective distribution, this shift had been already begun by the ECJ; in the leading case, Metro 1, the Court held that a simple selective distribution system would not infringe Article 101(1).5 This was crucial because,. However, they usually neglect that the prosecution of competition law infringements can Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis, pp.